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AbstrACt
Introduction Anomalous experiences are common 
within the general population, but the frequency and 
intensity is increased in young people with psychosis. 
Studies have demonstrated that perceptual biases 
towards noticing these phenomena plays a role, but the 
way one thinks about one’s experience (metacognition) 
may also be relevant. While poor metacognitive function 
has been theoretically associated with anomalous 
experiences, this relationship is currently unclear. 
However, metacognition may work along a continuum 
with various metacognitive levels, many of which have 
been demonstrated as impaired in psychosis. These 
metacognitive components may interact via processes 
that maintain poor metacognition across levels, and that 
potentially impact both what people do in their everyday 
lives (functional outcome) and how people feel about 
their everyday lives (subjective recovery outcome) in 
young people with psychosis compared with healthy 
control participants.
Methods and analysis This study will investigate 
the association and contribution of metacognition to 
anomalous experiences and outcome measures cross-
sectionally and longitudinally in a 36-month follow-up. 
First, young people with psychosis will be compared with 
healthy control participants on selected measures of 
anomalous experience, metacognition, and function, using 
analysis of covariance to identify group differences. Next, 
the relationship between metacognitive components and 
processes will be explored, including processes connecting 
the different components, using regression analyses. 
Finally, mediation analyses will be used to assess the 
predictive value of metacognitive measures on outcome 
measures, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally at 
36 months, while controlling for symptoms and cognition.
Ethics and dissemination Ethical and Health Research 
Authority approval has been obtained through Camberwell 
St. Giles Research Ethics Committee (reference number: 
17/LO/0055). This research project will be reported within 
a PhD thesis and submitted for journal publication. Once 
key predictive components of poor outcome in psychosis 
are identified, this study will develop a series of dynamic 
models to understand influences on outcome for young 
people with psychosis.
IntroduCtIon 
Anomalous experiences refer to a rich 
number of various psychic phenomena. 
These experiences can be divided into three 
main categories: anomalous self-experiences, 
the sense that you are not ‘real’ (distortions 
in experience of self and being); anoma-
lous perceptual experiences, hearing sounds 
which cannot be accounted for by the envi-
ronment (distortions of sensory events in 
various domains; auditory, visual; touch; 
taste); and anomalous delusional beliefs, 
experiencing unusual thoughts or beliefs. 
These experiences may be common within 
the general population1 2 but the frequency 
and intensity of these anomalous experiences 
is increased in those with psychosis or those 
with emerging severe mental health difficul-
ties3 4 and may predict psychotic symptoms at 
a later stage.5 6 Research has suggested that 
anomalous self-experiences are suggested to 
precede and generate ‘surface-level’ anoma-
lous perceptual experiences (hallucinations)7 
and anomalous delusional beliefs may be 
developed from anomalous experiences,8–10 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This is one of the first studies to assess metacogni-
tive processes as predictors of functional outcome in 
young people with psychosis, and one of the first to 
assess metacognition as a longitudinal predictor of 
functional outcome in young people with psychosis 
sample.
 ► This study has used up-to-date paradigm within the 
field of metacognition to avoid biases.
 ► Due to length of follow-up period, it may be difficult 
to engage follow-up participants within this study.
 ► If recontacting is difficult, the study may only have 
power to detect effects of the separate paths of the 
longitudinal analyses, not the full model.
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suggesting a hierarchical framework between the anoma-
lous delusional beliefs, experiences and self-experiences.
Many theories have been proposed to understand 
anomalous experiences, including source-monitoring 
deficits11 and aberrant salience hypothesis.12 Signal 
detection theory (SDT) has been the foundation to this 
research and studies using SDT have demonstrated that 
anomalous perceptual experiences are associated with 
perceptual signal detection biases13 14; bias towards stating 
that a stimulus was present when it was in fact absent. 
Such signal detection biases have been consistently shown 
within psychosis/psychosis-proneness literature15–17 and 
suggest that top-down processes on (false) perception 
can lead to hallucinations or delusions.8 18 19
Recent evidence suggests these signal detection biases 
are associated with metacognition in healthy students,20 
and metacognition may therefore play a role in anoma-
lous experiences. Metacognition is defined as ‘thinking 
about thinking',21 22 an abstract view of the object level.23 
Literature has demonstrated that hallucinatory experi-
ences and delusional beliefs/ideation have been associ-
ated with metacognition (overconfidence, specifically) 
in both clinical and non-clinical groups.24–26 In partic-
ular, those with psychosis demonstrate more incorrect 
self-monitoring responses with higher confidence,27 28 
also present in those with a history of hallucinations,29 
and those at high-risk groups.30
This research has not been consistent (see Gawęda et 
al28) as some studies did not control for objective perfor-
mance, crucial for metacognitive efficiency scores.31 32 A 
recent controlled study demonstrated that individuals 
with first-episode psychosis (FEP) and those at risk were 
more likely to misattribute an imagined action for a 
performed action compared with healthy controls,30 
but found no difference in misattribution of verbal or 
non-verbal actions, which suggests the deficit in meta-
cognition may be across several modalities. However, 
metacognitive efficiency/sensitivity (measured using 
meta-d′) is known to be modality-specific33 34 and anom-
alous perceptual-experiences (eg, hallucinations) can 
vary in modalities.35 It has also been acknowledged that 
auditory anomalous experiences are most common in 
psychosis,36 37 all of which may suggest a modality-specific 
association with auditory or visual anomalous experiences 
and perception/metacognition. This present study will 
assess the modality-specific association between percep-
tual bias (signal detection bias) and metacognitions with 
anomalous perceptual experiences in visual and auditory 
modalities, while controlling for objective performance 
(see figure 1).
Limited research has assessed the association between 
anomalous self-experiences and metacognition, but it may 
be suggested metacognitive efficiency may also be associ-
ated with anomalous self-experiences, previously alluded 
to by Dokic and Martin.38 This study will empirically test 
the association between anomalous self-experiences and 
perceptual biases and metacognition. Anomalous self-ex-
periences and anomalous delusional beliefs have not 
been considered to be modality-specific; therefore, these 
measures are hypothesised to be related to both visual 
and auditory perceptual signal detection biases and meta-
cognitive ability.
Metacognition has been considered fractionated and 
can appear in many different forms, associated within a 
dynamic model.23 39 Three levels of metacognition have 
been proposed: (i) metacognitive efficiency: ‘knowing 
that you know’,40 and this level in particular may 
involve unconscious knowledge to generate a ‘feeling 
of knowing’41 and has been shown to be modality-spe-
cific,33 which can be assessed by within-task confidence 
ratings; (ii) metacognitive experience: appraisal of one’s 
experience or performance after an activity; and (iii) 
metacognitive knowledge/ability: capacity to think about 
one’s or others’ experience or abilities, on which Lysaker 
and colleagues have grounded their work (see Lysaker 
et al). These metacognitive levels may influence each 
other via metacognitive processes. Nelson and Narens23 
highlighted two processes: (i) metacognitive controlling 
processes (ie, such that knowledge is used to control, 
guide and correct ongoing action)42 and (ii) metacog-
nitive monitoring processes (ie, monitoring of ongoing 
experience in order to recognise anomalies and update 
higher level beliefs),43 which are important for accurate 
metacognitive functioning.
As metacognition works in a hierarchical fashion, it 
may be expected the poor metacognitive efficiency in 
psychosis, demonstrated above, can impact the next 
component on the continuum: metacognitive experi-
ence, via metacognitive processes. However, Gilleen et al44 
demonstrated that metacognitive experience is on 
Figure 1 Proposed model including associations between perceptual signal detection bias and metacognitive efficiency with 
various anomalous events: anomalous experiences and beliefs, and the associations between metacognitive aspects.
 o
n
 15 N
ovem
ber 2018 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/
BM
J O
pen: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-022546 on 3 November 2018. Downloaded from 
3Wright AC, et al. BMJ Open 2018;8:e022546. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-022546
Open access
average intact within a group of individuals with schizo-
phrenia, while metacognitive knowledge/ability is deficit. 
The dissociation between the different levels of meta-
cognition may be the result of impaired metacognitive 
processes (self-reflectiveness and set-shifting),45 akin 
to various other studies.46–48 Due to limited studies, it is 
currently unclear which metacognitive processes may be 
driving these metacognitive difficulties. This study aims 
to further understand the difficulties in metacognitive 
processes in young people with psychosis and matched 
healthy controls within two models (figures 2 and 3).
From this, we will assess which metacognitive compo-
nents may impact on functional outcome: a measurable 
aspect of an individual’s specific activities of daily living. 
Research suggests functional outcome is predicted by 
neurocognition,49 50 functional capacity (measured using 
real-life performance skills task),51–53 negative symp-
toms,54 which has been demonstrated to show a syner-
gistic interaction with cognition to impact functioning,55 
and, importantly here, metacognition. Metacognitive 
ability, measured using the Metacognition Assessment 
Interview (MAI) or MAS,22 56 appears to play a crucial 
role on functional outcome, independent of cogni-
tion and symptoms.57–59 In a recent study, Davies et al60 
demonstrated that metacognition partially mediates the 
relationship between cognition and functional capacity, 
and fully mediates the relationship between functional 
capacity and functional outcome. Limited research has 
assessed whether metacognitive processes are also rele-
vant in maintaining poor functional outcome over time, 
independent of cognition. With this in mind, a metacog-
nitive factor will be derived from all metacognitive vari-
ables above to explore the impact on functional outcome 
and capacity (see figure 4) and a longitudinal model will 
also explore the relationships over time.
Functional outcome has also been associated with 
subjective recovery outcome (self-rated outcome 
reflecting sense of well-being and quality of life).61 62 
Metacognitive capabilities were related to components 
of recovery beyond the effects of psychiatric symptoms, 
including aspects of quality of life.63–65 There is a complex 
relationship between metacognition, functional outcome 
and subjective recovery outcome. This study will assess 
these relationships to enable in-depth understanding of 
functional recovery.
This study aims to develop and test a series of dynamic 
models to understand (i) the nature of metacognitive 
deficits compared with healthy controls, (ii) the relation-
ship between metacognitive components (iii) and the 
influences of metacognition on anomalous experiences 
and objective/subjective functional outcome for young 
people with psychosis. If these proposed models can be 
demonstrated empirically, this can help to understand 
and remediate poor outcome within psychosis.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Anomalous experiences will be associ-
ated with increased signal detection biases and poor 
metacognitive efficiency, and this relationship will be 
domain-specific.
Hypothesis 2: Metacognitive control processes will signifi-
cantly predict metacognitive knowledge/ability and 
metacognitive monitoring processes will significantly 
predict metacognitive experience. Metacognitive control 
processes will significantly predict metacognitive experi-
ence and metacognitive monitoring processes will signifi-
cantly predict metacognitive efficiency.
Hypothesis 3: Metacognitive variables (metacognitive 
knowledge/ability, metacognitive processes and meta-
cognitive experience) will significantly predict outcome 
measures (functional capacity, functional outcome and 
subjective recovery outcome) in young people with and 
without psychosis, even after controlling for anomalous 
experiences, symptoms and IQ.
Hypothesis 4: Metacognitive variables (metacognitive 
knowledge/ability, metacognitive knowledge processes 
and metacognitive experience) will significantly predict 
outcome measures (functional capacity and func-
tional outcome) at 36-month longitudinal follow-up of 
participants in young people with psychosis, even after 
controlling for symptoms and IQ.
Figure 2 Part of figure 1 model. Proposed associations between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive experience with 
monitoring and controlling processes.
Figure 3 Part of figure 1 model. Proposed associations between metacognitive experience and metacognitive knowledge with 
monitoring and controlling processes.
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MEtHods
design
This is a cross-sectional and longitudinal study. This 
cross-sectional aspect will explore (i) deficits in metacog-
nition between young people with psychosis and healthy 
controls; (ii) interrelations between different metacogni-
tive components and processes across the whole sample 
and (iii) the contribution of specific novel metacognitive 
variables to anomalous experiences and outcomes and 
(iv) a longitudinal aspect will identify whether metacog-
nition predicts experiences and outcomes at 36 month 
follow-up period (psychosis sample only).
Participants
Seventy-three young people with psychosis will be 
recruited. This sample will be made up of a convenience 
sample from first episode services and the remaining 
individuals will be those re-recruited from a previous 
FEP sample (previous n=80), to take part in the main 
cross-sectional study and longitudinal follow-up aspect. 
Participants from the previous FEP study have baseline 
data on metacognition, functional capacity, functional 
outcome, symptoms and cognition.60 These data will form 
the baseline data for the longitudinal analysis. All partic-
ipants with psychosis will be 18–40 years of age, able to 
read and communicate in English and receive treatment 
for psychosis with a UK Early Intervention in Psychosis 
service at first assessment. Participants with organic 
causes for psychosis or those with a diagnosis of substance 
use disorder will be excluded.
Seventy-three healthy control participants will be 
recruited as a comparison group. These participants will 
be 18–40 years of age, able to read and communicate 
in English and matched on age, gender and education 
with the psychosis sample. Participants will be recruited 
through advertisement within the local community, for 
example, in libraries, cafes and on social media. Partici-
pants with current mental health problems or history of 
psychosis will be excluded following screening questions: 
(i) Are you currently experiencing any mental health 
difficulties? (ii) Are you on any psychotropic medication/
substances? (iii) Have you been in contact with psycho-
logical or psychiatric services for psychological problems? 
(iv) Has anyone in your immediate family experienced 
an episode of psychosis? For example, parents, siblings. 
If healthy control answered yes to any of the questions, 
these participants were deemed ineligible to take part in 
the study.
Any participant with hearing or sight problems which 
cannot be will be excluded. Data collection will be under-
taken within a National Health Service (NHS) building or 
community setting between 10th March 2017 and 4 May 
2018. The end date of the study is 18th September 2018.
Patient and public involvement
Patient and public involvement is primarily via the Psychosis 
Interest Group run by the Service User and Carer Involve-
ment Coordinator at the Sussex Partnership NHS Foun-
dation Trust Research and Development department, and 
service users within the Psychosis Theme Group (PTG). 
The first author met with the PTG to consult on the devel-
opment of this project, including the design, method and 
procedure of the project. The lived experience group have 
viewed all the measures, including the two main computer 
tasks (visual and auditory tasks), and provided extensive 
feedback which has been incorporated into this project. 
Study participants who consent to receiving the study 
results will receive these by post/email. The first author and 
Figure 4 Proposed model for cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses including indirect effects from symptoms and 
neurocognition to metacognition and functional capacity to functional and subjective outcome.
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the PTG will continue to meet to consult on recruitment 
procedures, and on the plans for dissemination to service 
user groups following data analysis.
Cross-sectional measures
Anomalous experience measures
Anomalous perceptual experiences: Multimodal Unusual Sensory 
Experiences Questionnaire.35 This measures anomalous percep-
tual/sensory experiences with six subscales. Both the full 
scale and subscales have been demonstrated as possessing 
good reliability (auditory r=0.72, visual r=0.72), good 
validity between clinical and non-clinical group (Cohen’s 
d=0.96) and significance with all other anomalous experi-
ence scale, and internal consistency (auditory α=0.82, visual 
α=0.88). The auditory and visual subscales will be used for 
this study which each provide a combined score for pres-
ence and frequency of anomalous experiences.
Anomalous self-experiences: Cambridge depersonalisation 
scale (trait and state versions).66 The trait version includes 
29 items measuring frequency (never to all the time) and 
duration (few seconds to more than a week) of anoma-
lous self-experiences over the last six months. It demon-
strates high internal consistency (>0.6), good validity with 
other scales (r=0.8) and good reliability (α=0.89),66 and is 
useful for assessing depersonalisation in a schizophrenia 
group.67 The state version includes 22 items measuring 
anomalous self-experiences within-the-moment on a scale 
of intensity from 0 to 100. Subscales of the Cambridge 
Depersonalisation Scale (CDS) are ‘alienation from 
surroundings’, ‘anomalous subjective recall’, ‘emotional 
numbing’ and ‘anomalous body experience’.
Anomalous delusional beliefs: Schizotypal Symptom Inven-
tory.68 This measure assesses residual psychotic symptoms, 
providing a total score with separate subscales for paranoia, 
anomalous experience and social anxiety.69 This present 
study will use the paranoia subscale as a measure of anom-
alous delusional beliefs and the anomalous experience 
subscale as a measure of anomalous perceptual experiences, 
to confirm Multi-Modality Unusual Sensory Experiences 
Questionnaire data assessing anomalous perceptual expe-
riences. This scale demonstrates high internal consistency 
(non-clinical sample α=0.87 and clinical sample α=0.92), 
good validity with other scales (Positive and Negative 
Syndrome Scale (PANSS) with total r=0.59 and paranoia 
r=0.6) and good test–retest reliability (0.85 for total and 
0.6–0.84 for subscales).
Metacognition
Metacognitive efficiency
This encompasses separate computer-based visual and 
auditory detection task. The critical task in both para-
digms is to make two forced-choice binary judgments of 
whether a visual or auditory stimulus (dot or tone) was 
present or absent (first judgment) within a noisy picture 
or presentation of white noise, and whether this was asso-
ciated with high confidence or low confidence in the first 
judgment (second judgment).
The first judgment can be used to calculate a score 
for signal detection perceptual sensitivity and percep-
tual signal detection bias. Perceptual sensitivity (d′): the 
ability to correct report whether the stimulus (dot/
tone) was either present or absent. SDT posits that 
detection-making involves depicting whether certain 
waveforms called signals may or may not be embedded 
within background ‘noise’, using internal responses.70 
Perceptual bias (B) is the tendency to report one deci-
sion over the other, for example, stating the stimuli was 
present when it was in fact absent. The internal responses 
from perceptual sensitivity score are then compared with 
a decision criterion (c) so all evidence above criteria 
elicit a response of ‘present’ compared with below the 
criteria elicits the response of ‘absent’.71 The perceptual 
sensitivity score and the decision criterion can be fitted 
to an empirical receiver operating characteristic curve, 
enabling us to assess perceptual biases in responses, 
for example, whether someone was more or less likely to 
report stimuli as being present based on a lower/higher 
decision criterion.
The second judgment can be used to calculate a score 
for metacognitive sensitivity and metacognitive efficiency. 
Metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d′) is the ability to discrim-
inate between correct and incorrect judgements. Alike 
to the SDT above, metacognitive sensitivity is based on 
assessment of sensitivity (how well confidence ratings 
discriminate correct from incorrect trials) and response 
bias (overall propensity for reporting high confidence). 
However, this score from the second judgment must take 
into account first judgement performance.72 Meta-d′ indi-
cates the d′ that would have been predicted to result in 
the confidence rating assuming the SDT. Optimal meta-
cognitive sensitivity is when perceptual sensitivity score is 
matched. Meta-d′ greater or less than d′ indicates meta-
cognition is better or worse than d′.34 Metacognitive effi-
ciency is one’s ability to discriminate between one’s own 
correct or incorrect perceptual decision, while taking 
into account objective performance.32 This is calculated 
as meta-d′/d′. Metacognitive efficiency (meta-d′/d′) was 
chosen as a more robust form of perceptual metacogni-
tion, over metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d′) which was 
previously used by researchers.73
Performance on the first judgemnt will be held 
constant throughout the task and across participants 
(using a 1-up-2-down staircase procedure) to ensure 
that metacognitive sensitivity/efficiency is measured 
independent of task performance and produces valid 
scores.
Studies including signal detection tasks typically involve 
a large number of trials (~400), to avoid statistical bias 
and large variance in scores.74 However, following a pilot 
study, we reduced the trials to 200, while maintaining 
reliable data. To ensure the feasibility of conducting 
this study within a clinical population, who may present 
difficulty with attention and concentration,75 the two 
computer tasks have been developed from a pilot study 
within a healthy student population.76
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Alongside this, participants will be asked to prospec-
tively and retrospectively rate their performance on the 
detection tasks. These ratings will be used to assess meta-
cognitive knowledge and metacognitive experience.
Metacognitive knowledge: The prospective rating ('How 
well do you think you will perform overall? For instance, 
if you think you will get it right every time, select 100 
(all correct). If you think you will be correct none of the 
time, select 0 (none correct). You can select any value in 
between 0 and 100 to indicate what percentage you think 
you will correctly identify’) will assess task-related meta-
cognitive knowledge.
Metacognitive experience: The retrospective rating (‘How 
well do you think you performed overall on the task? For 
instance, if you think you were right every time, select 100 
(all correct). If you think you were correct none of the 
time, select 0 (none correct). You can select any value in 
between 0 and 100 to indicate what percentage you think 
you correctly identified’) will assess task-related metacog-
nitive experience.
Metacognitive ability
This will be assessed using the Metacognitive Assessment 
Interview56 to measure metacognitive ability/knowledge. 
This measure assesses the ability to understand ‘the self’ 
and ‘the other’; termed as one multidimensional construct 
as ‘metacognition’. This measure has demonstrated good 
inter-rater reliability and internal consistency (α=0.90 
for total metacognition), factorial validity and reliability 
(r=0.62–0.90).56
Metacognitive processes (monitoring and control)
Monitoring processes will be assessed using self-reflec-
tivity subscale of Cognitive insight scale.77 This measure 
possesses good internal consistency (α=0.68), conver-
gent validity (with SUMD-A delusions, r=−0.67)77 and 
test−retest reliability (r=0.90).78 Studies have demon-
strated this measure is appropriate to assess metacogni-
tive monitoring.45 79 Control processes will be assessed via 
set-shifting using trail-making task80 part B-A. This measure 
possesses good internal consistency (TMT-A α=0.39, 
TMT-B α=0.71), convergent validity (with Task Switching 
Paradigm r=0.32)81 and good reliability of other forms 
of TMT (r=0.78).82 This measure is appropriate to assess 
metacognitive control processes.45
Functional outcome
Functional outcome: Time Use Survey (adapted from 
Short83) provides a retrospectively rated objective 
measure for hours spent engaging in structured activity 
per week.84 This measure has been used within an FEP 
sample to assess functioning.85 86 This measure has good 
reliability (inter-rater reliability at 0.99),85 coder reli-
ability (89% accuracy),87 good validity as differences 
in time use have been demonstrated between different 
stages of psychosis, representing social recovery in 
psychosis,85 validity as TUS is comparable to studies using 
functioning measures.69
Functional capacity: The UCSD Performance-Based Skills 
Assessment53 provides a total score for real-life perfor-
mance skills based on simulated tasks. It was adapted to 
be applicable for UK participants. This measure demon-
strates high internal consistency (α=0.88), good validity 
with other scales (Direct Assessment of Functional Status 
(DAFS) r=0.86) and good test–retest reliability (r=0.91).88
Subjective recovery outcome: The Questionnaire of Process 
of Recovery89 provides a score for an individual’s subjec-
tive functioning (psychosis participants only). This scale 
has two subscales: intrapersonal items related to hope, 
empowerment, confidence and interpersonal related 
to connectedness with others, others help/care, reli-
ance. This possesses good internal consistency (intraper-
sonal subscale, α=0.94, interpersonal subscale, α=0.77), 
construct validity (General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) 
total score: intra, r=–0.83 inter, r=0.52) and reliability 
(intra, r=0.87, inter, r=0.77).89
Covariates
Symptom severity: This assesses symptoms of psychosis using 
PANSS90 (clinical participants only), which is the mostly 
widely used standardised instrument for assessing symptom 
severity in schizophrenia.91 This measure has demon-
strated good reliability and validity, and appropriate inverse 
correlations between positive and negative subscales.92 
This measure has good internal consistency (agreement 
for PANSS items r=0.69–0.94), construct validity (between 
PANSS and Andreasen rating system, r=0.77) and reliability 
(inter-rater correlations for PANSS scales ranged from 0.83 
to 0.87).92
Cognitive ability: This includes verbal IQ: Vocabulary task93 
is a measure of an individual’s verbal knowledge and fund 
of information. This measure as good internal consis-
tency (correlation with other cognitive measures range 
r=0.54–0.79), construct validity (with WASI-III, r=0.88) 
and reliability (0.90–0.89) and test–retest (0.88)93; and 
performance IQ: Matrix reasoning task93 is a measure of 
individual’s ability to mentally manipulate abstract symbols 
and perceive the relationship among them. This measure 
as good internal consistency (correlation with other cogni-
tive measures range r=0.59–0.63), construct validity (with 
WASI-III, r=0.66) and reliability (0.88–0.96) and test–retest 
(0.76).93
Longitudinal measures
For participants who have baseline data, this comprises 
of the following measures outlined above: metacogni-
tive knowledge/ability and metacognitive monitoring 
processes; functional outcome and functional capacity; 
and all covariates.
AnALysIs
sample size
Two sample size estimates have been combined to ensure 
the analyses have sufficient power to detect effects.
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First, sample size to detect differences between indi-
viduals with psychosis and healthy control participants 
on metacognitive efficiency. Using G power with 0.8 
power, 0.57 effect size based on a previous metacognitive 
efficiency task in psychosis94 and 0.05 alpha, the proposed 
total sample size is 28 (14 per group). Second, a regres-
sion analysis to assess the predictive value of metacog-
nitive knowledge/ability, processes and experience on 
outcome measures (controlling for symptoms and IQ) 
will be conducted. G power estimation was used for a 
power calculation based on a power of 0.80, effect size 
of 0.31360 and alpha of 0.05. This suggested for six predic-
tors a total of 55 participants are required.
In terms of the mediation analysis, power estima-
tion was calculated using the Monte Carlo method 
to estimate power for complex mediation models 
(see Thoemmes et al95). Using fixed parameters from 
Davies et al60 and power at 0.8, this suggested a total 
sample size of 146 participants to detect mediation effects, 
outlined in the above model.
In terms of the longitudinal analysis, as many of the 
original sample (N=80) as possible will be followed up to 
maximise statistical power.
Planned data analysis
Data will be double entered and checked for accuracy, 
and checked for outliers.
Missing data will be considered as ‘Missing At Random’ 
(MAR), which means the missing variables are related 
to additional observed variables within the data, but 
values of missing data itself. Missing data will be treated 
according to best practice.96 Principled missing data 
methods will be used which combine available informa-
tion from the observed data to estimate the population 
parameters and/or the missing data mechanism.97 Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) involves using 
all the observed data and creating values for missing data 
using maximum likelihood estimations. This works well 
provided that the model for the complete data is real-
istic.98 FIML will be used within this study which is consid-
ered most appropriate for MAR data and for mediation 
analyses.99 Quantitative data (including demographic 
information) will be reported using descriptive statistics, 
for example, means and SD.
Data will be analysed using SPSS and Mplus software. 
Group differences of all metacognitive measures and 
perceptual signal detection biases between young people 
with psychosis and healthy controls will be assessed, 
controlling for age and IQ. Linear regression analyses 
will be used to assess how metacognition (and perceptual 
signal detection biases) predicts anomalous experiences. 
Cross-sectional and longitudinal predictive analyses 
will be conducted, including regression analyses which 
will assess whether metacognitive components—knowl-
edge/ability, experience and efficiency—are predicted 
by metacognitive processes. A mediation analysis will be 
used to check whether functional capacity, functional 
outcome and subjective recovery outcomes are predicted 
by metacognition and metacognitive processes, while 
controlling for anomalous experiences, symptoms and 
cognition. These analyses will include bootstrapped 
bias-corrected CI.
dIsCussIon
Our assumption is that metacognitive variables predict, 
and maintain, anomalous events, poor objective and 
subjective recovery outcome in young people with and 
without psychosis. Particularly in young people with 
psychosis, metacognitive deficits may predict long-term 
functional outcome.
The study results will be an important addition to the 
literature and for clinicians for four main reasons: (i) this 
study tests a proposed model from previous literature 
which may help understand poor functional outcome in 
psychosis, (ii) from this novel intervention studies can be 
developed to tackle the potential metacognitive deficits 
in psychosis which predict this poor functional outcome, 
(iii) this is one of the first studies to assess metacogni-
tion as a longitudinal predictor of functional outcome in 
young people with psychosis sample, and finally, (iv) our 
studies use up-to-date paradigms within the field of meta-
cognition to avoid biases.
Limitations
A foreseeable limitation is that the FEP sample will 
comprise both a previous FEP sample and new partici-
pants who are currently engaged in early intervention 
services (EIS) in Sussex. Therefore, individuals will 
be at various stages of their recovery and support from 
the EIS which adds variation in terms of symptoms and 
recovery. With this in mind, symptoms will be controlled 
in the main analysis. However, this will enable exploration 
of factors which predict this variation. Due to length of 
follow-up period, another limitation may be the difficulty 
in re-recruiting these participants into the study. If recon-
tacting is difficult, the model may not have full power. If 
so, the individual paths of the model in the longitudinal 
analyses will be explored.
EtHICs And dIssEMInAtIon
This study has been reviewed and approved by Camber-
well St. Giles Research Ethics Committee (reference 
number: 17/LO/0055). The data will be stored securely 
in accordance with usual NHS procedures and data will 
be governed by the sponsor: University of Sussex. This 
research project will be reported within a PhD thesis, and 
will be written up for publication in scientific journals.
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